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In the Amazonian department of Caquetá (Colombia), 
considered a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
stronghold, 300 families are currently challenged with implementing 
the peace agreement in their territory while also navigating the road 
to sustainable development. This process entails trusting others, 
collaborating, and making decisions about health and education 
services, environmental problems, economic issues, and even aspects 
of everyday life. The Paisajes Conectados program is focused on 
reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable development in 
two municipalities of Caquetá. Its mission is to build new skills and 
share knowledge within local communities in order to strengthen 
governance and participation. This paper presents the findings of a 
field practicum, developed with the objective of determining 
community perceptions of the Capacity Building and Governance 
Strategy implemented under the Paisajes Conectados program in the 
context of a transition from conflict to peace.   
 
Author’s Note 
What is at the heart of peace-building after five decades of 
violence and civil war in Colombia? A peace agreement signed 
between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerillas is shifting the power balance in 
many regions of the country. Through demobilization and 
disarmament, FARC has abandoned its long-standing role as a 
powerful referee of economic, social and political affairs in certain 
regions. Simultaneously, the Colombian State intends to enter regions 
where distrust is prevalent due to decades of federal neglect. In the 
Amazonian department of Caquetá, considered a FARC stronghold, 
300 families are currently faced with implementing the peace 
agreement in their territory while also forging the road to sustainable 
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development. This process entails trusting others, collaborating, and 
making long-term decisions about health and education services, 
environmental problems, and economic issues alongside daily 
complications. The Paisajes Conectados (Connected Landscapes) 
program, implemented by the Colombian NGO Fondo Acción in 
2013, focuses on reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable 
development in two municipalities of Caquetá. The program aims to 
build new skills and share knowledge within the local communities in 
order to strengthen governance and participation. This paper 
presents the findings of a field practicum, developed with the 
objective of determining community perceptions of the Capacity 
Building and Governance Strategy implemented under the Paisajes 
Conectados program in the context of a transition from conflict to 
peace. Governance refers to the set of rules that communities require 
and utilize in order to make their own decisions.   
Among other results, the practicum revealed that communities in 
Caquetá identify the need to develop skills for conflict resolution, 
cooperation and teamwork, and the need to strengthen mechanisms 
for participation in the agreements that are relevant to their lives and 
territory. These results might help the national government 
implement the peace agreement in the region and achieve Goal 16 of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) - Peace, Justice and 
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Introduction 
 
Colombia and conflict have historically gone hand in hand. Even though the country 
elected the first democratic government in South America, 150 of the 200 years since 
Simon Bolivar and his army gained independence from Spain have been scarred by 
civil strife (Killcullen and Milles 2015). In 1819, when Colombia gained 
independence, the new nation was politically divided between Centralists and 
Federalists, led by Bolívar and fellow patriot Santander respectively. These factions 
gradually evolved into the Conservative and Liberal parties by the 1840s. Both blocs 
spent most of the 19th and half of the 20th centuries struggling for political power 
(Killcullen and Milles 2015). The confrontation reached a critical point in 1948 when 
Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a populist politician running as Liberal presidential candidate, 
was murdered. The magnicide sparked a dark period called “La Violencia” (Killcullen 
and Milles 2015) that took the lives of some 300,000 people and displaced thousands 
from rural areas to the main cities (Killcullen and Milles 2015). 
 
In an attempt to end the conflict, Liberals and Conservatives signed a covenant in 
1956 where both parties agreed to share power (Killcullen and Milles 2015). Though 
the period dubbed the National Front (1958-1974) quelled violence, it also blocked 
political pluralism, failed to deliver equity, and generated widespread discontent. 
“Colombia’s temperate, urbanized, populated, developed center contrasted with its 
tropical, rural, sparsely inhabited, neglected periphery. Structural inequality and lack 
of opportunity created a fertile ground for revolutionaries seeking to overthrow the 
system.” (Killcullen and Milles 2015, 118). By 1964, in the middle of the political 
truce, Colombia had two major guerrilla groups: the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Maoist National Liberation Army 
(ELN). Moreover, under the claim of electoral fraud in the 1970 elections (the last 
held under the National Front), a new urban guerilla group, the M-19, entered the 
scene. 
 
According to these groups, armed struggle to achieve social justice was their only 
recourse. They financed subversion through kidnapping, extortion, and bank 
assaults, and by the 1980s began “taxing” coca crops (Killcullen and Milles 2015). It 
didn’t take long for FARC and the paramilitary armies to connect with the complex 
network that produced and exported cocaine to the US and Europe (Killcullen and 
Milles 2015).1  
 
Participation in the drug trade meant growth for the illegal armies and a significant 
escalation of the armed conflict. By the last decade of the 20th century, violence, 
drugs, and social injustice painted Colombia as a failed state (Killcullen and Milles 
2015). FARC controlled large swaths of the country including two of the biggest 
regions, Meta and Caquetá. In 2002, following a failed peace negotiation process 
with FARC, President Andrés Pastrana negotiated “Plan Colombia”, a US-backed 
                                                 
1 Some of the first paramilitary forces were created during the 1960s by the Colombian 
military as part of its counterinsurgency efforts. Subsequently, many paramilitary forces trace 
their development to wealthy landowners, drug traffickers, multinational corporations, 
members of the security forces, and politicians. 
166 Consilience 
 
military and intelligence strategy aimed at strengthening the rule of law and 
combating FARC and other illegal groups. President Álvaro Uribe Vélez continued 
the plan for eight more years, delivering accurate blows and debilitating FARC and 
other sources of violence and destabilization (Killcullen and Milles 2015). 
 
However, the conflict was not over and the military, social, and economic costs were 
becoming unsustainable. When President Juan Manuel Santos took office in 2010, he 
focused on finding a “third way” out of a conflict that had given the country a 
shameful record (Santos 2014). “After Syria, Colombia has the world’s largest 
number of internally displaced people. This has bred food insecurity and loss of 
livelihoods; it is associated with child labor, school desertion and sexual exploitation 
– as well as the recruitment by armed groups of thousands of mostly indigenous 
children” (World Food Programme 2016). 
 
The Peace Process 
 
“The word is “opportunity”. We must not limit peace to the silence of the rifles. The most 
remarkable issue is that today there are new opportunities to believe in, create, and re–construct 
ourselves through dialogue and respect.”  
Humberto de la Calle, Head of the Colombian Negotiation Team, 2016 
 
The Colombian government negotiated a peace accord with FARC, a process that 
took four years beginning in March 2011. “Initial contacts [were] kept confidential to 
protect [the] process’s early viability” (de la Calle 2016). With a defined agenda, the 
negotiations went public in October 2012. They would address five topics: rural 
reform, political participation, illicit drugs, victims, and the end of conflict. The 
agenda also involved the design of a transitional justice to deal with war crimes, as 
well as measures to implement, verify, and endorse the process (Peace Goverment 
Team Colombia 2016).   
 
Negotiations ended successfully in August 2016, and the peace agreement was 
presented to Colombian citizens and international authorities (Peace Goverment 
Team Colombia 2016). For the first time in 52 years of continuous war against 
FARC, an opportunity to believe in peace was possible. However, a majority of the 
citizens voted against the subsequent referendum to ratify and implement the 
agreement, due to concerns about the treatment of the rebels (Reiter 2016). 
According to opponents of the peace agreement, “The justice components of the 
peace agreement, which centered on truth, reconciliation and reintegration, rather 
than solely on trials, were tantamount to allowing rebels to get away with murder” 
(Reiter 2016). After a month of re-negotiation, FARC, the government, and some 
opponents of the initial agreement reached a “new final accord” that improved legal 
provisions, defined crimes that would be dealt with by special judges, and provided 
clarity on how FARC would transform into a political party (Peace Goverment Team 
Colombia 2016). 
 
The department of Caquetá 
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Caquetá has a total area of 88,965 square kilometers (four times the state of New 
Jersey), and a population of 465,477, 46% of whom are between the ages of 15–44, 
and of which 80% live in rural areas (Caqueta Goverment 2014). The life expectancy 
is 69.6 years for men and 64.9 years for women, and the population growth rate is 
12.93% (Caqueta Goverment 2014). Less than half of Caqueteños (46.2%) have 
finished elementary school, and only 35.8% have graduated from high school. Barely 
30% of those living in rural areas have full access to public services like sanitation, 
electricity, and potable water (Caqueta Goverment 2014). As of 2015, 41.3% of the 
population was living in poverty – 117,315 more than reported in 2014 (Valencia 
2016).  
 
The department’s heterogeneous population is composed mostly of colonos: displaced 
families from nearby Andean departments (Huila and Tolima, for example) who 
traveled during the La Violencia years to the sparsely populated and “open lands” of 
Caquetá in search of opportunity (Arcila, et al. 2000). This involuntary migratory 
process was complemented by state-sponsored colonization. By 1964 the central 
government, promising land and loans to those who moved to Caquetá, managed to 
attract large numbers of dispossessed families from other regions. But given the poor 
quality of the soils, agriculture was not an option for most of those who relocated to 
Caquetá, and so the colonization attempts were economic failures (Arcila, et al. 
2000). 
 
Caquetá has always been in the periphery. The region has historically represented an 
opportunity to secure property (Arcila, et al. 2000), yet land tenure is uncertain. 
Moreover, poor soil quality makes producing adequate yields difficult. Most of the 
region is isolated, as road infrastructure is deficient, and rivers are the main 
communication routes (Arcila, et al. 2000). 
 
The region’s long history of war and pervasive neglect by the central state created a 
power vacuum that was readily filled by FARC. The rebels took over some of the 
sixteen municipalities in Caquetá by the late 1970’s. They did not face much 
opposition from locals; instead, they found that most believed in the ideal of an 
equitable society and blamed the government for their poverty. FARC had an 
identical speech and used marketing to discredit the government (Arcila, et al. 2000). 
The rebel army soon became a parallel authority (Arcila, et al. 2000). Nevertheless, 
over the years some active local civil groups of farmers and ranchers emerged. Rafael 
Orjuela, a community leader from Cartagena del Chairá, recalls that “in the times of 
the guerilla, we had the initiative of creating a manual that contained sixteen 
environmental provisions ranging from prohibiting logging on river banks to barring 
entry to the reserve zones that we the communities had created” (Semana Sostenible 
2017).  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the insurgent illegal army built up its presence in the 
region. They recruited adults and children from rural areas, cultivated and protected 
coca crops, charged coca paste “taxes”, opened and controlled cocaine trade routes, 
and established connections with drug kingpins (Arcila, et al. 2000). FARC also made 
alliances with local politicians in order to protect their interests. In several elections, 
the armed group coerced civilians into voting for their candidates (Nunez and 
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Moreno n.d.) while also kidnapping, threatening, or murdering political rivals (Arcila, 
et al. 2000). According to official data, internal conflict victims in Caquetá total 
372,661 (Ciro 2016). These include victims of homicide, forced displacement and 
kidnapping. The graph below shows how, at the end of the 20th century and in the 






Implementation of the peace agreement, however, promises to turn over a new leaf 
for this region. The government has announced investments in public goods and 
local development. Implementation requires unprecedented levels of participation 
and consultation with local communities, as decisions over economic, environmental, 
and social development will have to originate from the bottom up. These new rules 
will affect the way stakeholders interact, implement changes, and measure impacts on 
communities. 
 
One of the most significant changes will be FARC’s promise to disarm, demobilize, 
and instead act politically. “FARC reiterates its disposition to use only words as a weapon to 
build the future. Count on us, peace will triumph,” declared FARC’s top commander 
Rodrigo Londoño last October (CITATION). If the bells toll for peace, there must 
be new institutions to direct collaboration, participation, and decision-making in 
Caquetá and other parts of the country where, until recently, weapons and 
intimidation have previously prevailed in the absence of the rule of law. 
 
Graphic 1. Kidnappings and displacement in Caquetá. 
Source: Misión de Observación Electoral, 2008. 
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Field practicum approach: Collaborative planning and community capacity 
building  
 
The peace agreement effectively changes the institutions influencing decision-
making, as FARC is no longer the authority in the region. These changes render the 
traditional decision-making model obsolete, as it assumes the world is rather like a 
machine which can be designed to produce particular outputs, when in reality our 
contemporary society is complex, dynamic and evolving (Innes and Booher 2003, 6). 
In contrast, the bottom-up collaborative planning process required under the peace 
agreement is grounded in the belief that local communities know best the 
multifaceted and fluctuating realities they face (Chambers 1995). 
 
The collaborative planning approach is an effective strategy for dealing with conflict 
where other practices have failed (Innes and Booher 1999). Collaborative planning is 
a social response to changing conditions in increasingly networked societies, where 
differences between communities and individuals are growing, and where 
accomplishing anything significant requires creating flexible, innovative linkages 
among many players (Innes and Booher 1999). In this approach, outcome and 
process are valued in the same way (Innes and Booher 1999), and pluralism is an 
opportunity for innovation and creativity. 
 
Collaborative planning is based on the idea that solutions can be achieved through 
dialogue that engages different interests surrounding a task or problem. It requires 
that every stakeholder is equally informed, willing to listen to the concerns and 
expectations of others, and respectful of differences (Innes and Booher 1999). This 
produces two different types of outcomes: tangible and intangible. Tangible results 
comprise agreements, policies, decisions, strategies, or new ideas for approaching a 
problem. Intangible outcomes include social and political capital formation, stronger 
relationships, enhanced trust, a mutual understanding of diverse interests, and thus 
genuine communication and joint problem solving (Innes and Booher 1999). Often, 
these intangible results become the foundations for future collaboration. 
 
Community Capacity Building (CCB) is the increase in the ability of community 
groups to define, assess, analyze, and act on any important matter (Gibbon, Labonte 
and Laverack 2002). The capacity of a group depends on resource opportunities or 
constraints (political, ecological, and environmental), and the conditions in which 
people live (Gibbon, Labonte and Laverack 2002). It is important to understand that 
“community capacity is neither seen as means or as end, rather it is viewed as both. 
It is not a substitute for program goals or objectives but it creates a separate set of 
objectives that run parallel to those of specific programs. This is called a ‘parallel 
track’ approach in which community capacity is strengthened at each stage of the 
project.” (Laverack 2005).  
 
Building community capacity is a central and shared concern for funding agencies, 
implementing organizations and communities because it enables the development, 
implementation, and maintenance of effective community-based projects (Goodman, 
et al. 1998). According to Marion Gibbon, Ronald Labonte, and Glenn Laverack 
(2002), there are nine dimensions that ascertain capacity building in a community 
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(Table 1). These dimensions allow for analysis of community skills, resources and 
knowledge, and all are equally relevant.  
 
Table 1. Dimensions of community capacity building. Adapted from Gibbon, 
Labonte and Laverack, 2002 
 
The Paisajes Conectados program: An alternative for conservation and 
sustainability in Caquetá 
 
In 2013, closely following the official launch of peace talks with FARC, Fondo 
Acción, a Colombian NGO, began implementing the Paisajes Conectados program 
in Caquetá. The program is based on the assumption that “if provided with 
alternative sources of income and the appropiate tools for governance, local 
populations can actively reduce forest clearing and natural habitat degradation.” 
(Fondo Acción 2015, 3)  
 
To achieve this change, the program has three strategies:  
 
(i) Reduce deforestation by promoting alternative, profitable, environmentally 
sound, low-carbon economic options for food sovereignty and sustainable 
livelihoods in rural communities;  
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(ii) Strengthen and empower local civil society and local/regional governments; 
(iii) Create conditions to enable Payments for Environmental Services (PES). 
PES is an economic mechanism that compensates ecosystem managers for 
the conservation of the ecosystems that provide environmental services such 
as clean water, biodiversity, clean air (Fondo Acción 2015). 
 
Fondo Acción works with fifteen local community-based organizations and external 
decision makers such as public officials in rural areas of the Solano and Cartagena del 
Chairá municipalities in Caquetá. The NGO provides support (financial, technical, 
strategic communications) and stimulates a collaborative planning approach backed 
by a Community Capacity Building and Governance Strategy (CBGS). The CBGS 
process involves: 
 
• Determining the need for capacity-building and strengthening in the 
intervention areas 
• Conducting capacity-building activities with individuals and organizations from 
local communities, NGOs and governments, using the following 
instruments: 
o Coaching: The Leadership School (Escuela de Líderes) is a coaching 
program to help community leaders and local teams improve their 
individual and social communication and organizational skills, build 
leadership, and create high performance teams 
o Training: Field Schools (Escuelas de Campo), Learning Routes (Giras 
de Intercambio) and workshops facilitate sharing best practices on 
issues related to natural resource management, associativity, 
management, information systems and communal voluntary action 
o Formal education: Community members have access to the Certificate 
in Rural Development in the Amazon, offered in partnership with 
Amazonia University 
• Creating platforms for civil society participation to facilitate agreements on 
guidelines and regulations for sustainable management of natural resources 
between local governments and the community. 
• Designing or strengthening mechanisms for sustainable planning and 
development (Communal Development Plans, Land Management Municipal 
Plans, Local Community Council Action Plans, Municipal Environmental 
Agendas and Municipal Development Plans.)  (Fondo Acción 2015) 
 
“For over thirty years, FARC rebels taught us that all things coming from outside were a threat to 
our land and rights. They said that outsiders only wanted information, and that nothing good would 
come from them (…) Fondo Acción is the first NGO that has challenged the idea that all Caquetá 
communities are rebels and terrorists; they wanted to work with us, to help us understand how 
valuable and important we are, through the forest conservation program. They have earned our trust, 
and they proved that outsiders are not always the bad guys,” said Victor, a participant in 








The field practicum intended to determine community perceptions about the 
Capacity Building and Governance Strategy (CCBGS) implemented under Paisajes in 
the midst of a transition to peace. This qualitative and participatory assessment also 
identifies strengths and weaknesses of the capacity-building strategy, which can direct 
fine-tuning by Fondo Acción. 
 
The approach uses semi-structured interviews and workshops with a sample of 
program participants from both localities. Study members have participated in 
Paisajes Conectados for at least six months through capacity building and 
governance activities and/or as beneficiaries of small grants and other program 
investments. The approach assumes that people are able to relate to and recognize 
the nine dimensions if they have enough information about the program and if the 
questions and instruments are clear and culturally appropriate. I applied these filters 
to select interviewees and workshop participants. University of Florida professors, 
Fondo Acción team members, and community members revised and tested the 
questions and workshop activities before field implementation. 
 
I conducted the following activities: 
 
1. Documentary review of ten relevant publications by Fondo Acción under the 
CCBGS.  
2. Semi-structured interviews with five Fondo staff members from the Paisajes 
Conectados team. 
3. Twenty-two semi-structured interviews with program participants (men and 
women between 21 and 65 years old; 65% were men) in Solano and 
Cartagena (Annex 1). Nine interviews in Cartagena were conducted during 
the Leadership School (May 17-19, 2017). Eleven interviews were conducted 
in Solano during the delivery of small grants (May 17-21, 2017). I had two 
additional interviews with the director of the Caquetá Women’s Platform and 
with a Professor from Amazonía University. Both have been closely involved 
with the CCBGS since 2014. 
4. One workshop with twenty participants (evenly distributed between men and 
women, ages 18 to 65) in Solano (Annex 2). 
5. One workshop with eleven program participants (evenly distributed between 
men and women, ages 18 to 65) in Cartagena del Chairá (Annex 2). 
 
Data analysis included transcribing all interviews and workshop outcomes. I treated 
all nine community capacity dimensions as categories of analysis and classified all 
answers and information in these dimensions. This is the first assessment that has 
been carried out with the information. Further analyses will take place during late 
2018 using N-Vivo software under the advice of University of Florida professors. 
Therefore, the following results are preliminary and were shared with Fondo Acción 
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In 2015, Fondo Acción implemented a community capacity-building and governance 
strategy that focused on strengthening skills and abilities relevant to sustainable 
natural resource management. It also trained individuals to lead and participate in 
public policy debates on topics such as food security, sustainable rural development, 
sustainable cattle ranching, gender, and conservation.  
 
The assessment has revealed that program participants from both localities recognize 
the importance and usefulness of this strategy and value the skills and capacities 
acquired in the Field Schools (ECAs), Learning Routes, Leadership School, and 
workshops. Participants report that they have learned practical skills, technical 
abilities, and knowledge to improve farm planning, productivity, natural resource 
management, project design, and communication, among other things. The 
Leadership School has helped them take on active roles in their communities and to 
realize how these roles differ from FARC-style leadership. Indeed, participants 
highlight the importance of building new local leadership in Caquetá. 
 
Communities are facing a two-fold challenge: managing a territory without FARC’s 
traditional authority structures and learning to negotiate with public organizations 
that are knocking at the door. Practicum interviews and workshops reveal that 
leaders, community members, and the Fondo Acción team are aware that new skills 
are necessary in the post-conflict context. Communities identify the need to develop 
the capacity for conflict resolution, cooperation, and teamwork, as well as the need 
to improve mechanisms of participation. 
 
The following graphics represent contributors’ perceptions regarding community 
capacity. Participants were divided by village, or vereda, and were asked to score from 
1 to 5 how much they agreed with the statements I read. Spiderweb representations, 
shown below, revealed perceptions regarding the nine community capacity domains 
(Solano includes three nodes: Herichá (1), Mononguete (2) and Las Mercedes (3); 
Cartagena includes three local groups). 
 



















Spider web representation of Cartagena del Chairá. 
 
 
Participation and leadership are strong attributes of both communities. The conflict 
has forced communities to build local leadership and empowered citizens to 
negotiate with legal and illegal armed actors. In fact, the decision to let Fondo 
Acción into their communities resulted from a long negotiation between community 
leaders and FARC.  
 
Solano participants identified strengths in participation, leadership, program 
management, and resource mobilization. The weakest dimensions were the ability to 
work with others (external and internal actors) and the capacity to formulate 
questions (‘asking why’). The testimonies and workshop revealed two possible 
reasons for the first finding. For years, FARC played several roles: that of an 
environmental authority, an administer of justice, and a referee for everyday issues 
(divorces, thefts, homicides, etc.). As FARC served as the authority on social and 
economic matters, little space was left for autonomy or collaboration. Participants 
also noted that a culture of mistrust has prevented them from working with others. 
Regarding the ‘asking why’ dimension, participants recognized that though they 
inquired about benefits and subsidies offered by projects, they never delved into the 
political, social, or environmental consequences of these projects.  
 
However, some of the participants acknowledged their independence in deciding 
whether to participate in the program. “Those of us who decided to participate in the 
program were called naïve. They said Fondo Acción was going to take our farms 
from us, that they were lying, and they encouraged people to abandon the program. 
We told them that before this program, nothing had come to Solano so we had little 
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to lose. Three years later, several families are asking to be part of it. Fondo Acción 
did not let us down,” said Alirio, one of the first participants in Solano. 
 
In Cartagena del Chairá, the results were different. The strongest dimensions 
identified included organizational structures, problem assessment capacities, 
leadership skills, and the ability to collaborate with others. Participants argued that 
these are the result of FARC's political and social work with the Juntas de Acción 
Comunal (JAC)2, the main local authority. “The movement (FARC) gave us health, 
education, technical assistance, and dedicated time and resources to help us create 
strong civil organizations. But we were the ones who decided to let them (Paisajes 
Conectados) come to Cartagena, not FARC,” said Ricardo, a member of the 
Cartagena community. 
 
After the peace agreement was signed in 2016, Cartagena del Chairá communities 
decided to keep the organizational structure in place because they considered it an 
effective mechanism to deal with the central government’s programs and institutions. 
The Cartagena participants report that their capacity to work with others is a core 
value of their community and that it has resulted from the foundation laid by FARC. 
Thus, collaborating with other JACs and organizations is common practice. 
 
Another finding from the interviews and workshops was the role of women. 
According to program data, most of the participants in Paisajes Conectados are 
women. This is uncommon in Caquetá’s male-dominated society and culture, 
according to the Women’s Platform. Women were more willing to join the program, 
motivated their male partners to participate, and encouraged other women and local 
organizations to trust Fondo Acción. Most of the male interviewees acknowledged 
that they did not believe in the program and its activities; this perception changed 
when their wives began receiving materials, small grants, and training in sustainable 
agriculture, and when they witnessed how women readily participated in program-




Before the peace agreement was signed, many observers asserted that the biggest 
obstacle to peace would be assuring the implementation of various provisions of the 
agreement. While the uncertainties related to post-conflict implementation of the 
peace agreement are important, even more significant for achieving a lasting, durable 
peace in Colombia is progress towards sustainable development goals. Initiatives like 
the Paisajes Conectados program provide important lessons concerning best 
practices for sustainable development, which can in turn inform similar development 
initiatives in other former conflict territories. The field practicum conducted in 
Caquetá is one of the first efforts to carry out academic research on communities in 
former FARC-controlled areas. How have these communities fared after years of 
war and isolating conditions? How can they deploy the social capital developed 
during the conflict to ensure that they will be able to more effectively manage their 
                                                 
2 JAC is a mechanism of participation that enables people from villages and neighborhoods to organize 
themselves to promote development projects (Interior Minister, 2017). 
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natural resources in an era of peace? The field practicum report provides important 
information that helps decision makers better understand the local context and craft 
development interventions. 
 
The field practicum findings also show that changes in Solano and Cartagena del 
Chairá’s systems have been mainly influenced by outsiders. However, the social 
capital, mindset transformations, and knowledge produced by the communities 
through the Paisajes Conectados program can provide them with pathways to 
communicate their history and future vision for Caquetá with outsiders. Their vision 
is one of peacebuilding and forest protection, to leave future generations with the 
possibility of sustainable livelihoods. To implement the peace agreement and 
sustainable development goals, the Colombian government must listen to 
communities that were deeply affected by the armed conflict and take full advantage 
of environmental project outcomes. The government must acknowledge the social 
capital developed by these communities during the conflict, represented in the 
community capacity domains. Finally, it is important to build bridges and synergy 
among communities, NGOs, and local governments to produce policies and 
programs that will help strengthen community capacity and conservation efforts 
going forward.    
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Interviews with people of the community 
 
1. Can you please give me your full name? 
2. How long do you live in Caquetá? 
3. Were you born in the region? If you don't How did you arrive to Caquetá? 
4. What the thing that you like the most about the region? 
5. What attributes have the people of your community? 
6. What do you cultivate in your farm, what animals do you have? 
7. How do you find out about Paisajes Conectados and Fondo Acción?  
8. What is the purpose of the program? 
9. What kind of vinculation do you have with Paisajes Conectados (employee, 
beneficiary)? 
10. How long do you work in the program's activities? 
11. How was this place before Paisjes Conectados started? 
12. Regarding the activities, you have worked, is there anyone that you remember 
the most? Why? 
13. Where do you traditionally gather for the meetings and activities? 
14. Who participate in these activities? Do you remember somebody in 
particular? 
15. If you can tell me the three things that the program has taught you, what 
would it be? 
16. How have your life changed since you are in the program? 
17. Who makes the decision about what is going to be made in the community? 
18. Can you please describe how was and how is the process to implement a 
project in the community? 
19. How would you describe the work that the community is doing with with 
Fondo Acción 
20. What do you like about the work with this organization? 
21. What do you want to be different? Why? 
22. Which are the most important resources that the community give to 
participate in the programs or projects (time, logistics, food)? 
23. Do you work with other organizations? If yes how is the relationship with 
them? 
24. How have your life changed since your are in the program? 
25. How do you imagine the region in a couple of years? 
26. What should happen in order to make the think you imagine real? 










Objective: To identify what dimensions from the community capacity approach 
have materialized in the communities of Caquetá that have been beneficiaries of 
Fondo Accion's interventions.  
Target population: Men and women between 18 and 70 years-old. 
Time: 4 hours 
• The activity will be recorded all the time 
Workshop Guide 
1. Greetings (10 min): 
When people arrive, the facilitator gives each person a name tag to write 
his/her name.  
 
2. Icebreaker Name and throw (20 min): To help learn another’s name in an 
enjoyable and non-threatening manner. Participants make a circle, and the 
facilitator says her name and throws a ball to another person. The second 
person says his name and throws the ball. This process continues until 
everyone has said their names and threw the ball.  After two rounds, 
facilitator throws the second ball in the same order she did the first time. 
Participants must be aware of saying their name and throwing the ball in the 
order they did the first time. In the end, the circle will have three balls and 
will force that participants be aware to say their name and throw the ball in a 
specific order.  
Materials: 3 balls 
 
3. Meeting objectives and establishing rules of participation (15 min):The 
facilitator takes the objectives written on flip chart paper to the meeting, and 
puts them in a visible location after participants sit after the first activity. To 
establish the rules for participating, the facilitator asks the people to write 
what they think the rules should be on a piece of colored paper, and then to 
tape the paper onto the wall. When everyone has finished his/her paper, the 
facilitator asks which is the most important paper on the wall, and on 
another piece of flip chart paper writes down what people say. At the end, 
the facilitator will ask them if they are comfortable following the rules of 
participation written on the flip chart.  
 
4. Exercise #1 (60 min): Spider web representation: The objective of the 
activity: To identify what dimensions of the CCB are acknowledged by the 
beneficiaries of Fondo Acción's projects and the why they acknowledged 
them. The facilitator asks each participant to fill in the matrix individually 
(below). After 15 minutes the facilitator divides the group into three smaller 
groups and provides instructions to fill in the matrix again together in a flip 
chart. After 30 minutes, the facilitator asks the small groups to make a round 
table and present the form. Meanwhile, the facilitator takes notes. Once small 
groups finish the presentations of their matrices, the moderator closes with 
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the ideas that come up from the activity. Materials: matrix prints, markers, 
stickers, pens, tape, note-taking poster, 3 big spider webs.  
 
5. Transition between activities (5 min): Moderator goes around the circle 
and asks participants which of the dimensions are more important for them 
to make better community decisions. 
 
6. Exercise #2 (80 min): Social mapping and timeline: Objective of the 
activity: To identify what places have been used and what activities have 
occurred in the projects that are acknowledged by the community.  
 
6.1 Participants sit around a table and the facilitator gives them a flip chart. 
Then, she asks the group to organize themselves into a line from the earliest 
(January) birthday to the latest (December). Once they have formed a line, 
the moderator asks them to take a marker and draw on the paper when the 
program starts, what activities they remember and when did the meet the last 
time. When they finish, the facilitator ask participant to discuss the timeline.  
6.2 Energizer: “All move who…”: Stand or sit on chairs, in a circle, with one 
person (Facilitator first) in the middle. Say ‘All move who…’ and then add, 
for example: are wearing something blue; traveled more than a day to get 
there; got up this morning before 4 am.  
6.3 The facilitator divides the groups again two groups: men and women.  
Moderatos gives a map of Solano and ask each group to draw the places 
(church, school, community center) where they have had activities of the 
projects and identify what activities they have developed in those places. 
After 30 minutes, the facilitator asks them to present their work and 
comment on them. Meanwhile, facilitator takes notes. Once small groups 
finish the presentation, facilitator makes a closing with the ideas that came up 
from the activity.         Materials: 2 big copies of Solano's map, markers, note 
taking poster  
 
7. Break (15 min): NGO will provide the snacks for the break.  
 
8. Final reflection (30 min): Objective of the activity: To summarize and 
clarify ideas that have come up from the activities. Considering the activities 
that were made, the facilitator asks some clarifying questions about the 
activities and ask the participants to give a conclusion about the results of the 
activities, community’s characteristics, and the skills they have honed through 
the project's.  
 
 (Dimension) (Statement) (Grade)  (What are the 




 (Participation is mandatory for 
the empowerment of the 




or small spaces, people from the 
community can reflect, analyze and 
act in the issues that are important 




(Leadership in the community is 
exerted by different people in the 
community such as women, men, 
young, elders, indigenous, and it 




(People who are acknowledged as 
leaders enable community to have 
more support from other 
organizations, access to resources 
(economic, material) and better 
understanding among the people 





(Community involves different 
actors as the church, school 
teachers, Young people, women 
organizations to analyze the 





 (Community is able to identify the 
causes and solutions to the 




 (Community is able to mobilize 
resources (human, financial, 
materials) inside and outside of the 
community to manage solutions to 
the problems that affect it) 
  
 (Asking why)  (Before making a decision, the 
community is able to inquiry about 
the political, economic and social 
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consequences that could arise from 
the decision it makes) 
 (Links with 
others) 
 (Community is able to manage 
alliances with other communities or 
organizations to develop or 
implement their projects) 
  
 (Role of the 
outside agents) 
 (Community is able to work with 
external organizations like the 
local government, non-profit 
organizations, private companies to 
mobilize resources and technical 
support for developing their own 




Community has the control, 
independence and power to decide 
over the design, implementation 
and evaluation of the programs 
and projects that are implemented 




(community has roles in its 
organization to manage the projects 
and the decision-making process) 
  
 
*Adapted from (Gibbon, Labonte and Laverack, Evaluating community capacity 
2002) 
 
 
 
